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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
was caused or could have been caused by the accident, insurer, in absence of such
evidence, being entitled to a directed verdict."
"Presumptions of fact proceeding from other facts in proof are rebuttable
or disputable as a matter of course, and, since they merely amount to an
assumption of what may be true, may be- entirely overcome or removed from
the case by competent proof going to supply the fact presumed."
Mayfield v. Montana Life Ins. Co., et al. (Montana), 205 Pac. Rep., p. 669.
"Where general agent of an insurance company who had done considerable
profitable business for the company, and who made it a practice to represent
to prospective patrons that insurance taken out through him would be binding
on the company from the date of the first year's premium, and the passing of a
satisfactory m4dical examination, told an applicant who was particularly desirous
of having his life insured at the time of the application by reason of a contem-
plated journey that the insurance would take effect from the payment of premium
and the passing of a satisfactory medical examination, the conditions of the
receipt issued providing that the insurance should not effect until approval of
application at the company's home office were waived."
Camden Fire Ins.: Assn. v. Prezioso (Court of Chancery of New Jersey),
116 Atl. Rep., 694: "An insurance company's right against a tort-feasor,
through whose negligence loss occurred, to recover the amount paid on the
policy covering such loss, is not barred by a settlement between the latter and
the insured for a sum less than such tort-feasor's liability, though insured gave
a full release; such release being a fraud on the insurer."
EFFECT OF POLICE POWER ON DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.
An interesting case in which these two constitutional pci'lts were con-
sidered was Pennsylvania Coal Company, Ptf. in error, v. H. J. Mahon ct al.,
decided Dec. 11, 1922, and reported at U. S. S. C Adv. Ops. 192?-23, p. 154.
The Pennsylvania Coal Company owned a certain parcel of ground which
they conveyed, by deed, to plaintiffs in this case in 1878, In the deed the
Coal Company reserved the right to remove all the coal under the land-
the plaintiffs taking the premises with the risk and waiving all claim for damages
that might arise from mining out the coal. On May 27, 1921, an Act of Penn-
sylvania, commonly known there as the Kohler Act, was approved by the legis-
lature. This Statute, or Act, prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in such
way as to cause a subsidence of, among other things, a human habitation, with
certain exceptions, including among them land where the surface is owned by
the owner of the underlying coal, and is distant more than 150 feet from any
improved property belonging to any other person. After the passage of this
Act the grantees of the above property, H. Mahon et al., sought by a bill in
equity, to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their
property in such a way as to remove the supports and cause a subsidence of the
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surface and of their house. The grantees were, of course, relying upon the
Kohler Act while the Pennsylvania Coal Company was relying upon the reserva-
tion it had expressly made in the deed whereby it conveyed the land to H.
Mahon et al. The Court- of Common Pleas held that the Kohler Act, if applied
to this case, would be unconstitutional. However, upon an appeal to the State
Supreme Court it was held that while the Pennsylvania Coal Company had
contract and property rights protected by the Constitution of the United States
still the statute was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State. The
question arises-was this a proper exercise of the police power by the State or
was it taking property without due process of law? It is well understood that
certain values or rights which we enjoy are subject to implied limitations and
must yield to the police po %er, but such limitations must have certain limits or
the contract and due process clause are of no value. When the diminution
reaches a certain magnitude it must be an exercise of eminent domain plus just
compensation. Mr. Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States, after the case had been taken to said court, said,
"For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right. to mine it."
IVhen you take away the right to mine it it has almost the same effect for con-
stitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it, This would be the result
of the Kohler Act. While, as a general rule. property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if it goes too far it will constitute a taking. Whenever there is
such a taking it is presumed that it is wanted for a public use and even then it
is not taken without compensation. The statute in this case did not contemplate
the taking of property for a public use; neither did it contemplate giving com-
pensation to the one whose rights would be impaired. It could scarcely be said
to be a taking for public interest since the case involved only a single house-and,
since only a single private house was liable to be damaged it could not be con-
sidered a public nuisance. It was upon such reasoning as shown above that the
Supreme Court of the United States (Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting) held the
statute unconstitutional-a realization that the statute did not disclose a public
interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendants' con-
stitutionally protected rights.
PENALTIES UNDER REVENUE STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-
EFFECT OF GOOD FAITH.
A proper understanding of the case subsequently cited makes necessary the
setting out of certain revenue statutes. That is to say, Sec. 311 of the Munition
Tax Act of Sept. 8, 1916 (39 Stat. 782), provides that: "All administrative,
special and general provisions of law, relating to the assessment of taxes not
.pecifically repealed, are hereby made to apply to this title so far as applicable
and not inconsistent with its provisions." And Sec. 3176 R. S., as amended by
Sec. 16 of the Revenue Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 773), reads in part as follows: "In
case of any failure to make and file a return or list within the time prescribed by
lai or by the Collector, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall add to the
tax fifty per cent of its amount, except that when a return is voluntarily and
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